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What happened with eMudhra’s SSL certificates and the number 4?

TL;DR: A trusted SSL company’s secret signing key was the number 4.

  • Eight eMudhra certificates were protected by keys anyone could crack in under a second.
  • Whoever held those keys could have faked a secure padlock for any website.
  • Chrome, Firefox, Apple and Microsoft blocked the certificates within four days.
  • Browsers are protected, but older devices and apps that miss updates may not be.

Imagine discovering that the master key to a bank vault was a padlock with the combination “4”. That, more or less, is what happened to eMudhra in October 2026. Within five days of the discovery, the company announced it was walking away from the global SSL certificate business altogether.

What is an SSL certificate?

The padlock in your browser’s address bar comes from an SSL certificate (technically TLS these days, though most people still say SSL). It does two jobs. It proves the website is genuinely who it claims to be, and it scrambles the connection so nobody in between can read your passwords or card details.

Think of it like a passport. Anyone can claim to be your bank, but only the real bank can show a passport issued by a trusted authority. Those authorities are called certificate authorities (CAs), and your browser comes pre-loaded with a short list it trusts.

Each CA signs certificates with a private key, a secret number so long and random it should be impossible to guess. Whoever holds that key can issue a “passport” for any website and browsers will accept it. Guarding it is the single most important thing a CA does.

What went wrong at eMudhra?

In April 2025, eMudhra created a batch of new intermediate certificates, the middle layer between a CA’s root and the certificates it gives to websites. Eight of them ended up with keys that were anything but random. Instead of a number more than 100 digits long, each key was smaller than 256, so anyone could find it by trying every number from 1 to 255.

Security researcher Scott Helme recovered all eight on his laptop in under a second. One key was simply 4. Others were 56 and 115.

How could that happen?

eMudhra traced the problem to a faulty script used during its key generation ceremony. The script quietly produced a second set of weak keys alongside the proper ones, and because the labels looked similar, staff picked the wrong ones. The company admitted to human error at several steps.

Normally, when a CA key is compromised, someone has stolen it. Here, nobody needed to. The keys were effectively public from the day the certificates existed, around 17 months earlier.

How did the eMudhra incident unfold?

  • 17 October 2026: A researcher known only as “Wayne” spotted the problem and proved it by signing the message “We have a problem here” with every one of the eight keys. He reported it to Apple, Google, Microsoft, Mozilla and eMudhra. Chrome and Firefox blocked the certificates that day.
  • 18 October: eMudhra revoked all eight certificates.
  • 19 October: Apple blocked them.
  • 20 October: Microsoft followed. Mozilla made the incident public and removed trust in the eMudhra root certificate behind them.
  • 22 October: eMudhra announced it would leave the global SSL/TLS certificate business.

Why did the eMudhra certificates matter?

With any of those keys, a criminal could have created a valid-looking certificate for any website: your bank, your email provider or your own company site. Combined with a position on the network, such as a dodgy public Wi-Fi hotspot, they could impersonate that site and read or alter everything passing through, all with a reassuring padlock on screen. Cloudflare, which also trusted the certificates, warned of exactly this.

There are some saving graces. eMudhra says only one of the eight was ever used in production and none issued certificates to customers. There is no confirmed evidence anyone abused the keys, and the major browsers acted within four days. The uncomfortable unknown is that nobody can say for certain whether someone found the keys during the 17 months they were exposed.

What happened to eMudhra?

eMudhra said SSL made up only around 1% of its revenue and that rising compliance costs and free certificates from large providers had already squeezed that business. Its board decided to exit global SSL entirely, saying the public reaction was out of proportion to that slice of the company. eMudhra estimated around 30,000 customer certificates from the affected root needed replacing.

Is my business affected by the eMudhra incident?

Most people are already protected, provided their devices are up to date. The remaining risk sits outside the browser, in equipment and software that does not receive regular security updates.

  • Update everything. Browsers, Windows, macOS, phones and servers all received updates that block the bad certificates.
  • Remember the forgotten kit. Printers, NAS drives, CCTV, firewalls and older business applications keep their own lists of trusted certificates. Check for firmware updates.
  • Check where your certificates come from. Any website using an eMudhra (emSign) certificate needs a replacement from another provider.
  • Watch your renewal emails. In the same week, GoDaddy revoked over 400,000 certificates for an unrelated compliance error. Certificate problems can take a website offline with little warning.

If you have concerns about your website’s SSL certificates, please click here to contact us.

The padlock is only as trustworthy as the weakest company in the chain behind it, which is why browsers move so quickly when something breaks. Keeping every device and server updated is how you make sure that protection actually reaches your business, and it is a core part of our managed IT support.